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public entertainment interest in the details of a previously pub-
lished news event will not be jeopardized by the passage of time,
the principal case indicates that the extent of this interest in
the identity of the person involved will vary with the nature of
the injury that would be inflicted if the news item were revital-
ized.12
In summary, the significance of the present case in the doc-
trine of the right of privacy relates to the revitalization of news
events. In such cases the court balances the public interest in
entertainment against the private interest in withdrawing from
public surveillance, and in this process certain guiding principles
appear to be established: (1) The details of the news event,
excluding the plaintiff's identity, will always be the subject of
public interest in entertainment. (2) If the identity of the plain-
tiff is also revealed, the extent of the public interest in entertain-
ment will vary with the nature of the injury which would be
inflicted upon the plaintiff. (a) If the plaintiff's interest in free-
dom from mental disturbance is all that would be invaded, the
court will probably say the plaintiff has not acquired a right
of privacy; however, (b) if there is more serious tangible injury,
the court will probably say that the plaintiff's interest in his
right of privacy is predominant.
WILLIAM R. VEAL
WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION-HAZARDOUS NATURE OF THE EM-
PLOYER'S BUSINESS-PROXIMITY TO CUSTOMER'S MOTOR VEHICLES-
Plaintiff was injured while loading a truck in the course of his
employment. He maintained that although the employer's retail
feed business owned no motor vehicles, it involved their opera-
tion, since all feed was sold directly to customers who drove
their vehicles to the place of business. Held, the mere fact that
employee was required as a part of his regular duties to be near
motor vehicles, which his employer did not own, operate or con-
trol, did not convert the business from nonhazardous to hazard-
ous. Fields v. General Casualty Company of America, 36 So. (2d)
843 (La. 1948).
In order for a business to be hazardous within the meaning
of the Workmen's Compensation Act,' it must either be specifi-
cally designated as such or must involve the use of a contrivance
1. La. Act 20 of 1914 [Dart's Stats. (1939) §§ 4391-4432]. For a complete
discussion of hazardous businesses, see Malone, Hazardous Businesses and
Employment under the Louisiana Workmen's Compensation Law (1948) 22
Tulane L. Rev. 412.
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or device declared by the act to be hazardous.2 The scope of the
act has been enlarged considerably by this so-called omnibus
provision, which renders a business hazardous if it involves "the
installation, repair, erection, removal, or operation of boilers, fur-
naces, engines and other forms of machinery. ' '3 This provision has
been the basis for a long line of decisions holding businesses haz-
ardous which regularly use motor vehicles,4 despite the fact that
their use may not be indispensable. 5 It has been extended to
cover employees engaged in loading and unloading the standing
motor trucks of a hauling business.6 In the Haddad case 7 and in
most of the cases" which follow its doctrine, the employer owned
the motor vehicle in question. However, this doctrine has been ex-
tended without comment to cover situations where the employer
exercised control over vehicles owned by his employees but used
in the course of his business.9 Thus it appears that ownership
of the motor vehicle is not an absolute necessity.
The court in the instant case might find some comfort in
Reagor v. First National Life Insurance Company,'° which held
that the insurance business is not hazardous merely because its
agents travel on foot and are thus exposed to the perils of heavy
2. La. Act 20 of 1914, § 1(2) [Dart's Stats. (1939) § 4391].
3. Ibid.
4. Haddad v. Commercial Truck Co., 146 La. 897, 84 So. 197 (1920); Plick
v. Toye Bros. Auto and Taxicab Co., 127 So. 59 (La. App. 1930). See also
Staples v. Henderson Jersey Farms, 181 So. 48 (La. App. 1938); Franz v.
Sun Indemnity Co., 7 So.(2d) 636 (La. App. 1942); Youngblood v. Colfax Lum-
ber Co., 125 So. 883 (La. App. 1942). Malone, supra note 1, at 418, 419, 420,
421, 424, 432, 433; Comment (1947) 7 LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW 415, 421.
5. Holland v. Continental Casualty Co., 155 So. 63 (La. App. 1934); Crews
v. Levitan Smart Shop, 171 So. 608 (La. App. 1937); Richardson v. American
Employment Ins. Co., 31 So.(2d) 527 (La. App. 1947). Malone, supra note 1,
at 419, 422, 433.
6. Richardson v. Crescent Forwarding Co., 135 So. 688 (La. App. 1931);
Snear v. Eisenloh, 144 So. 265 (La. App. 1932); Hayes v. Barras, 6 So.(2d)
66 (La. App. 1941); Jones v. Williams, 33 So.(2d) 580 (La. App. 1947); Malone,
supra note 1, at 418, 425; Comment (1947) 7 LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW 419, 424.
Cf. Allen v. Yantis, 196 So. 530 (La. App. 1940).
7. Haddad v. Commercial Truck Co., 146 La. 897, 84 So. 197 (1920).
8. Holland v. Continental Casualty Co., 155 So. 63 (La. App. 1934); Young-
blood v. Colfax Lumber Co., 125 So. 883 (La. App. 1942); Franz v. Sun In-
demnity Co. of N.Y., 7 So.(2d) 636 (La. App. 1942); Richardson v. American
Employment Ins. Co., 31 So.(2d) 527 (La. App. 1947).
9. Morovitz v. K.C.S. Drug Store, 149 So. 244 (La. App. 1933). See also
Malone, supra note 1, at 418, 420; Powell v. Spencer Bros., 5 La. App. 218
(1926), cited with approval in Newsmith v. Reich Bros., 203 La. 928, 14 So.(2d)
767 (1943); Beebe v. McKeithen, 5 La. App. 179 (1926), discussed in Malone,
supra note 1, at 419.
10. Reagor v. First National Life Ins. Co., 28 So.(2d) 527 (La. App. 1946),
modified on other grounds in 33 So.(2d) 521 (La. App. 1947). See also Malone,
supra note 1, at 416. Accord: Horton v. Western Union, 200 So. 44 (La. App.
1941), discussed in Malone, supra note 1, at 418, 430, 523 and Comment (1947)
7 LouISIANA LAW REVIEW 418. Cf. Dejan v. Ujuffy, 14 Orl. App. 230 (La. 1917),
discussed in Malone, supra note 1, at 414, 416.
NOTES
traffic. This decision is eminently sound. Allowing recovery in
such an instance would create a serious administrative problem
and result in virtual abolition of the distinction between hazard-
ous and non-hazardous businesses.
The principal case can be readily distinguished from the
Reagor decision. Here the presence of the customers' motor
vehicles was invited by the employer and was vital to the con-
tinued successful operation of his business, as he was without
means to transport his product to customers. Therefore the em-
ployee was required as a part of his regular duties to work in
close proximity to motor vehicles essential to the employer's
business.
It is submitted that the court in the instant case might have
reached a contrary conclusion without fear of administrative
difficulties by viewing the employer as having made the motor
vehicles of the customers an integral part of his regular business.
Such a conclusion would be in accord with the policy of liberality
found in both the decisions and the act itself.
WILLIAM C. SANDOZ
WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION-LIABILITY TO EMPLOYEES OF IN-
TERMEDIARY IN LUMBERING CASES-Suit was brought against the
insurer of the Gross and Janes Tie Company to recover compen-
sation for injuries received by the plaintiff in the course of his
employment at a tie mill owned by McAllister. The tie company
negotiated with a third party landowner for the purchase of
timber for which the landowner was to be paid twenty cents
for each tie cut. The company then engaged McAllister to move
his tractor-type tie mill onto the land and cut the ties. He was
paid the market price less twenty cents per tie retained by the
company and remitted to the landowner.1 Held, that no relation-
ship of principal and contractor existed between the company
and the employer of the plaintiff; that the company was a pur-
chaser of manufactured ties, therefore, the plaintiff was not en-
titled to recover compensation from the company under Section
6 of the Workmen's Compensation Act.2 Grant v. Consolidated
Underwriters, 33 So. (2d) 575 (La. App. 1947).
1. Also deducted from the price paid to McAllister, but not material to
the purpose of this discussion, was twenty cents per tie which the company
retained and applied to a debt owed to the company by McAllister evidenced
by a chattel mortgage on the tie mill; and twelve to fourteen cents per tie
retained and paid to the landowner for services rendered in hauling the ties
after they were cut.
2. Louisiana Workmen's Compensation Law, La. Act 20 of 1914, as
amended, § 6 [Dart's Stats. (1939) § 4396].
19491
